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Abstract
The Provincial Supreme Law established a regulatory scheme that was not limited to the
mere enunciation of principles to be observed by the electoral regime to be sanctioned. It
expressly provided that the electoral law regulating the election of collegiate body mem-
bers should guarantee “effectively proportional representation”. The constitutional provi-
sion was regulated by the Provincial Act No. 201, which established the process of renewal
of elective authorities and adopted the proportional D'Hondt formula to determine the
composition of the Legislative Branch. A brief analysis of electoral processes that took place
between 1991 and 2015 will show how close to constitutional ambitions were the results
produced by the electoral system.
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Resumen
La Ley Suprema Provincial estableció un esquema normativo que no se limitó a la mera enun-
ciación de principios a observar por el régimen electoral que debía sancionarse. Expresamente
dispuso que la ley electoral que regulara la elección de integrantes de cuerpos colegiados ga-
rantizara una “representación efectivamente proporcional”. La reglamentación del precepto
constitucional se realizó con la sanción de la Ley Provincial Nro. 201 que estableció el proceso
de renovación de autoridades de base electivas y adoptó la fórmula proporcional D´hont para
establecer la composición del Poder Legislativo. Un breve análisis de los procesos electorales
realizados entre los años 1991 y 2015 nos dirá cuan cercanos a la aspiración constitucional fue-
ron los resultados producidos por el sistema electoral.
* Lawyer, graduated from Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Master's Degree in “Electoral Analysis, Law and Manage-
ment” from Universidad Nacional de San Martín. Master's Degree in “Political Parties” from Universidad Nacional de Cór-
doba. marcelodguzman@gmail.com
Guzmán, M.D. (2017). “Votes and seats. Proportional representation in Tierra del Fuego” Revista
Perspectivas de las Ciencias Económicas y Jurídicas. Vol. 7, N° 2. Santa Rosa: FCEyJ (UNLPam);
EdUNLPam; ISSN 2250-4087, e-ISSN 2445-8566 pp. 45-66. DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.19137/pers-
pectivas-2017-v7n2a03
46
VOTES  AND  SEATS .  PROPORT IONAL  REPRESENTAT ION  IN  T I ERRA  DEL  FUEGO  -  Ma rce l o  Damián  Guzmán  -  Pág s .  45 /66
Palabras clave
Derecho electoral – Tierra del Fuego – Representación proporcional 
I. Introduction
After twenty-four years in force, evaluating the provincial electoral system's performance
and results can provide some interesting insight. This job can be carried out by purely des-
cribing its normative features to expose its components and existing legislation; however,
we can also try to reach beyond and perform a systemic analysis of its workings, incorpo-
rating into the vision of electoral law some tools offered by political science and statistics.
This will help us to draw conclusions from a perspective that covers broader horizons than
those set by law1 .
The traditional view on electoral norms, generally emerging from other legal fields, has
placed these in an exogenous position regarding the political game intended to regulate,
in disregard of the fact that they arise from an agreement between preterit political stake-
holders -or maybe, not so preterit- who transformed them in imperative rules to abide by
in the processes of renewal of elective authorities2.
Therefore, that is the axis of the analysis that will follow below: a legal one, but also ackno-
wledging contributions from other fields of knowledge. These will help us reconstruct the
provincial electoral system movements throughout time in order to study if their outcomes
are “effectively proportional” regarding seat allocation and if not, to learn to what extent.
II. Electoral Regime & Electoral System. Electoral System Classification. Majority and
Proportional Systems. Types
An “electoral regime” consists of a set of norms, organized in single or dispersed legal
bodies, which includes the positive rules which regulate candidate elections for elective
positions in a particular State. The expression constitutes an essentially-legal notion.
The concept of “electoral system” is different as it determines the way voter decisions
turn into seats and also takes into account the interaction of the different variables that
come together in it - district magnitude, electoral formula, electoral barrier or threshold,
voting ballot structure, blank vote, among others.
1 It should be noted that many consider electoral law as a legal field with no scientific autonomy, subsumed in a grey
area between constitutional law, provincial public law, and even administrative law. Fortunately, for a few years now, this
country's doctrine has begun to transform the “rara avis” view that pervades the electoral field, echoing the Latin Ame-
rican and international trend towards considering that electoral law has autonomy, and a proper and specific object. In
this regard, we share Nohlen's words (2007: 31) that read: “Our discipline is self-contained; it is independent for it is based
on principles, methods and has its own object of study. It covers public law phenomena that require particular definitions
that are only adequate when applying its own rules. These definitions affect procedures, the safeguard system, and the
enforcing authority, among many other particularly specific elements.” 
2 This is a concept asserted by Escolar (2011: 55): “A determining factor in electoral governance is the institutions thereof
are intrinsically endogenous (Kheoane & Martin, 2003) to the electoral process. In fact, its regulatory scheme and its res-
ponsible authorities are directly or indirectly historical outcomes of the political authorities elected by it (in stable de-
mocratic backgrounds) or that brought them into existence in the first place (in democratic transition backgrounds).” 
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Basically, electoral systems can be classified into majority and proportional systems. The
former weight the greatest number of votes gained by a particular political force or candi-
dacy to assign the contested seats3 ; while the latter consider all votes received by the in-
tervening political groups to allocate the concerned seats through some mathematical
method. The reason behind this is that the basis for the proportional representation system
lies in the deliberate conversion of the share of votes won by a party into an equivalent
share of seats in the Legislature4 .
The aforementioned suggests that the aims pursued by both systems are dissimilar: for
the former, building legislative majorities; and for the latter, representing the diverse sec-
tors that converge in an election.
Majority systems have been credited with advantages such us avoiding party fragmen-
tation; fostering government stability; promoting political moderation; favoring alterna-
tion in the exercise of the public function, and offering voters the chance to directly elect
candidates. Conversely, proportional systems are recognized for allowing for the maxi-
mum representation of opinions in parliament; preventing the formation of artificial le-
gislative majorities; providing for negotiation and compromise of political forces to form
majorities; reflecting social change and deterring the formation of dominant parties5 .
Payne (2006: 41 ss.) adds that proportional representation systems prevent high numbers
of “worthless” or lost votes and highlights that they contribute to the representation of
minority parties.
Based on the premises that majority systems' outcomes open a significant gap between
votes and seats allocated to a certain political force6 , it is important to mention that pro-
portional representation systems emerged historically in Europe with the extension of the
right to vote to other social strata that had not been entitled to such; which is the reason
why they aimed at seeing correspondence between received votes and allocated seats so
3 Some examples are: a) Complete list (Arts. 44 and 44, National Act No. 140, which were in force in this country until the
electoral reform of 1912; b) Incomplete list (as per National Act No. 8871 -Sáenz Peña Act - and the current method of
national senatorial election set forth by art. 54 of the National Constitution); c) Single-member elections by constituency
(in force under National Act No. 4161, arts. 18, 19 21; and No. 14032).
4 In this regard, we can refer to Reynolds, Reilly and Ellis 2006: 67.
5 This is Nohlen's stance (1995): 50.
6To illustrate the distortion caused by the majority system, suppose a territory with 5 single-member districts that are to
choose 1 legislator each by a simple maximum of votes. Three political parties take part in the election and they obtain
the following percentages of votes:
Applying the simple maximum-of-votes criterion, the White party will get 3 seats; the Green party will get 1 seat, and
the Red party, 1 seat. This means that the White party, having an average of 28.2% of vote share, is granted 60% of the
seats; the Green party with an average of 26.4% of vote share, gets 20% of the seats; the Red party with an average of
22.4% of vote share, gets 20% of the seats; and the other parties do not get to be represented at all.
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as to ensure a minimum number of seats to the political elites displaced by the progress
of suffrage7.
However, the description above does not exhaust the basic typology of both systems.
There is a series of variants adopted by states throughout time, which have transformed
them into sort-of-pure forms. 
Within proportional systems subtypes, there are three primary formulas8: a) the Hare
Quota ; b) the D'Hondt method (greater average); and c) the Sainte-Lagüe system. The first
one establishes seat allocation favoring smaller parties; the second favors bigger parties;
and the last one is half way between those two9.
Hare Quota: It is the best proportional method, from a mathematical point of view, and
consists in determining a quotient (q) by the relation between the number of votes (v) and
seats (e) subject to election, which is represented by the following formula:
0=00
Once the quotient is determined, seats are allocated in the same number of times that
it is contained in the results secured by the candidate list. As regards seats that do not make
it to the formula, these are usually allocated using varied methods, with the higher remin-
der method being the most widely used.
D'Hondt Method: The number of votes (v) for each candidate list is divided by 1, 2, 3...
until reaching the total amount of seats (e) subject to election. Quotients (q) are decrea-
singly arranged, regardless of the list they belong to, in order to allocate seats.
This is represented with the following formula, with value e starting from 0: 
0=00+1
Sainte-Lagüe: This system is similar to the D'Hondt method, only quotients are obtained
from divisions by odd numbers (1, 3, 5, 7, 9, and so on), and then arranging the results in
decreasing order.
This is represented with the formula below, with value e starting from 0: 
0=020+1
It is worth mentioning that there are mixed methods, which are intended to leverage
the advantages of majority systems as well as the benefits of proportional representation.
These solutions force two systems to coexist, which use different mathematical formula-
tions, given that they couple majority representation single-member districts with propor-
tional representation by lists10 .
While I did include opinions on the characteristics of proportional systems, I must add that
these fail to mention the distortion produced when under- or over- representing political
7 This is Stein Rokkan's argument, which was cited, analyzed and criticized by Charles Boix in his article “Setting the Rules
of the Game. The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies” (1999: 609-644).
8 I only mention those that I considered paramount for this work's object, given that there are more variants and modified
versions.
9 Sartori 1994: 21.
10 Payne, Zovatto, & Mateo Díaz 2006: 105. Some examples are Germany and, at the sub-national level in Argentina, the
provinces of Cordoba, which has a unicameral Legislature -with 26 legislators chosen by majority system in single-mem-
ber constituencies and 44, by the proportional D'Hondt method- and Santa Cruz, which has a unicameral Legislature -
with also, 14 legislators elected by single-member constituencies and 10, by the proportional D'Hondt method.
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forces. Consequently, it should be stated that there is no electoral system that completely
prevents distortion or disproportion between votes and seats, however minimal. The level
of distortion caused in a proportional representation system exists due to the impact that
different variables have on the mathematical equation used to allocate seats. These will be
dealt with below to establish their effect on the provincial electoral system chosen to elect
legislators.
III. Electoral System Components. District Magnitude. Ballot Structure. Candidate List
Structure. Legal Threshold. Blank Vote
Certain interacting variables in the proportional electoral system make the seats subject
to popular election more or less accessible for political parties.
We identify the following:
a) District Magnitude: Refers to the number of seats subject to election in a predeter-
mined territorial unit. It is central for the intervening political parties to get any chance in
an election, as it is the most important factor that determines the proportionality or dis-
proportionality in a proportional representation system. The bigger the district, the greater
its proportionality will be11.
b) Electoral Formula: Refers to the mathematical procedure that enables the calculation
that will make for the conversion of electorate's valid votes into seats. This element deter-
mines, in theory, whether the system is proportional -in any of its variants-, or works as a
majority system, either absolute or relative.
c) Ballot Structure 12: Refers to the voting slip design, which includes the candidate lists
to be considered by the electorate. It can be a single ballot with all candidates presented
11 Nohlen 1995: 59; Sartori 1994: 21. Let us analyze an example: Suppose a district with a magnitude (M) of 3 disputed
seats and another with 13 disputed seats. Both apply the D'Hondt method, both register the same amount of total ba-
llots, both include the same political parties, and both produce identical results. These would be the comparative details
for both districts:
This clearly illustrates how the M3 district functions as a majority system with implied overrepresentation (as it is the
case with national legislators in this province); while the M13 district has more proportional results (comparing the per-
centage of votes with the percentage of allocated seats).
12 The referenced bibliography does not cover this component in great detail. However, it was included for it is relevant
to the electoral system of Tierra del Fuego, and the impact it has had throughout time. All the same, I would like to warn
the reader that the components of electoral systems dealt with in this work have been introduced to advance the pre-
sentation of the concrete case addressed. 
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by all political parties, or it can present them separately with the specific offer each group
submits to the voters13. Regardless of the methodology, the different candidate categories
can be included in a single slip, which could be divided or not; or be presented in physically
separate segments.
d) List Structure: Refers to the ability to choose the enumeration and order of candidates
just as it was willingly formulated by a certain political party, or also modify these elements.
When the voter cannot make any changes to the ballot, we say the list is blocked. On the
other side, it is unblocked when the voter can alter the prearranged order of candidates,
whether to favor or censor them. The voter will enjoy maximum freedom of action with
open lists to which they can add candidates from other or independent parties.
e) Electoral Formula: Also referred to as “legal representation barrier” 14, it expresses the
pre-established minimum number of votes that a political party must get in order to take
part in the seat allocation procedure provided for in the electoral formula 15. It serves the
purpose of excluding small political parties from the legislative body to foster a concen-
tration of the system. Its application affects the proportional results of the formula based
on its tabulation.
f ) Blank Vote: refers to the voter's decision not to support any party proposal. When it
reaches significant levels it affects proportionality as it influences the electoral threshold,
13 Examples of single-ballot voting are the current elections in the provinces of Cordoba and Santa Fe. The remainder of
the Argentinean provinces uses party ballots at the national level, and also, for example, Spain. 
14 Nohlen 1995: 79.
15 Notwithstanding the aforementioned, note should be taken of the existence of a natural threshold that is dependent
on the systemic combination of parties, candidates, and votes in certain election, which could prevail upon legal provi-
sions (Payne, 2006: 96). 
The electoral threshold strongly influences seat distribution proportionality; which can be illustrated with one example.
Examining the results of the provincial legislative elections in 2007, we can see how seats would have been allocated
according to the different formulas if there was, or not, a legal barrier of 5% of valid votes:
This Table was prepared by the author with data from the Electoral Court of First Instance of the Province
of Tierra del Fuego, Antarctica and the Atlantic South Islands.
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and seat allocation is performed taking into account only party names that have been ef-
fectively voted.
The interaction of all these elements will tell whether-in a concrete case and to what ex-
tent- the electoral system is permissive or restrictive.
IV.- The Provincial Electoral Regime
With strict adherence to the order included in Article 5 of the National Constitution,
the Constituent Convention of Tierra del Fuego held in 1991 established a governmental
republican regime and decided that the legislative branch would be exercised by a Uni-
cameral Legislature made up of fifteen members16 directly chosen by the electoral body,
with provision to eventually expand, based on population growth, with a maximum limit
of twenty-five legislators17. It set forth that the Electoral Acts to be passed provided for
obligatory, equal, secret, universal and individual votes; guaranteed “effectively pro-
portional representation” in collegiate bodies; and granted voters the ability to cross
out candidates from the lists used in the election. It ordered that candidate lists should
be included in separate slips in different colors for each category to be chosen. Further-
more, it considered the possibility that the elector could list candidates from other official
lists18.
The initiative of incorporating the “cross-out” system was introduced by Movimiento Po-
pular Fueguino (MOPOF), which laid down its numerical majority in opposition to the other
parties engaged in the Constituent Convention and intended to improve candidate selec-
tion methods. It voted its proposal on its own, as the remaining parties considered such
mechanism attacked party structures and left room for manipulating maneuvers, already
noted by the rest19.
The first election of provincial and municipal authorities was held under the Fourth
Temporary Arrangement of the Provincial Supreme Law which established the minimal
threshold to enable the crossing out of candidates in three percent (3%) of the votes
16 The Province of Tierra del Fuego with the Provinces of San Juan and Santa Cruz make up the group of Legislatures
with the smallest district magnitude in contrast with the rest of the country. The Province of San Juan has a similarly
elected Legislature, with a proportional system, while Santa Cruz provides a mixed system whose single-district pro-
portional component amounts to only ten legislators. The Constituent Convention chose to preserve the number of fif-
teen legislators, as it was the current case in the Territorial Legislature at the time, and it provided representation for all
political parties engaged in it. In this regard, the convention representative Martinelli said: “… we see that all fifteen le-
gislators provide for a significant representation of majority groups, and even minority groups, and that there have been
up to five blocks -if I recall correctly- from different political parties with the fifteen Legislators” (Constituent Convention.
Session Log. Volume II, page 835).
17 Provincial Constitution, Article 89: “Legislative duties will be exercised by a Legislature conformed by fifteen legislators
who will be directly elected by the people in the Province. When the population exceeds the number of one hundred
and fifty thousand inhabitants, this can be increased by one legislator every ten thousand inhabitants until reaching a
maximum of twenty-five legislators.
18 Provincial Constitution, Art. 201 in fine.
19 Tula & De Luca 1999: 121.
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won by the proposing political party20 to exclude them from collegiate bodies.
The Provincial Electoral Act, identified with number 201, was passed on December, 15th
1994 and was published on the Official Gazette on January, 9th 1995. It regulated consti-
tutional provisions which set forth:
a) Secret, universal, equal, personal, and obligatory vote (art. 3);
b) Proportional representation in collegiate bodies through the implementation of the
electoral D'Hondt method with a threshold of 5% of valid cast votes (art. 3421);
c) Ability to cross out candidates included in the party list the voter chose to ballot (art. 35 22),
with a threshold of ten percent (10%), to redefine the order predetermined by political parties; and
20 Provincial Supreme Law, Fourth Temporary Arrangement: “In order to summon provincial elections for the first time,
the National Electoral Code will apply as approved by Decree No. 2135/83, and amended by Acts 23.247 and 23.476, as
well as the Electoral System as approved by Act 22.838 and amended by Act 22.864, as far as they are compatible with
the provisions in this Constitution and the cross-out system. Until the Provincial Electoral Act is passed, the cross-out
system laid down in cl. 5) of Art. 201 will be applicable in conjunction with the D'Hondt system, so that the number of
votes will determine the number of seats corresponding to each political party in collegiate bodies. Cross-outs included
in voting slips will establish the order of appointment of available candidates, thus changing the printed order, which
will only be applied in an eventual tie. Cross-outs affecting an individual candidate who does not exceed three percent
of total votes in favor of their proposing political party will not be considered. Full candidates who are not elected will
be alternate officials in the order resulting from the application of the cross-out system; alternate candidates will be
called upon once the list is exhausted. Only for the first election of provincial authorities, vote counting can be divided,
which shall be conducted on each table and once electoral activities have concluded to determine the number of seats
allocated to each party in collegiate bodies. Cross-out counting can be delayed until the following day and will be con-
ducted by the Electoral Board while granting auditing to political parties. Cross-outs will be deemed as such when the
voter's will to cross out is evidently manifest on the slip. The voter shall cross out at least the last name of the candidate
they wish to exclude, and one candidate at a time; so if a cross-out covers more than one candidate, only that with the
clearest mark will be considered. Cuts in official voting slips shall not be considered as cross-outs for counting purposes,
only clearly marked lines or scratches shall be taken into account. Cut slips, as long as they are considered valid votes,
will not be counted as cross-outs if they are not marked in the manner set forth above. Ballots with cross-outs in all can-
didates will be held as valid, although they will not be computed for candidate allocation. Electoral authorities at each
table and party-related monitors shall be credited before the Electoral Court no later than five days before the election
and they shall be responsible for the correct assembly of ballot boxes to be returned to the Electoral Court, once counting
is performed under their supervision. Cross-outs in candidate categories where marks are not allowed will not be con-
sidered for any purpose.”
21 Article 34 of the Provincial Act 201 reads as follows: “In compliance with the item 4 of Article 201 of the Provincial
Constitution, seats will be allocated to each participating List through the D'Hondt system, with a barrier of five percent
(5%) of valid cast votes, according to the following procedure:
a) The total of votes awarded to each List that reaches at least five per cent (5%) of valid cast votes, shall be divided by
one (1), two (2), three (3), and so on until reaching all positions to be filled.
b) The resulting quotients, regardless of the List they belong to, will be organized in decreasing order in the same number
of positions to be filled;
c) In the event there were two or more identical quotients, these will be arranged in direct proportion with the amount
of votes polled by the respective Lists, and if these got the same amount of votes, the final order will result from a toss
held by the pertinent Electoral Board to that end;
d) Each List will be awarded as many seats as times its quotients appear in the order described in clause b).”
22 Article 35 reads, as originally drafted: “Legislators will be elected according to their order in the List and the number
of valid votes cast for each, by virtue of the cross-out system.
To that end and in compliance with the requirements in item 5 of Article 201 of the Provincial Constitution, voters will
be able to cross out candidates from lists on the ballot, according to the procedure instructed in Article 36 hereof.
Cross-outs included in voting ballots will establish the order of appointment of all available candidates, thus changing
the printed order, which will only be applied in an eventual tie.
Cross-outs affecting candidates that do not exceed ten percent (10%) of the total of valid votes cast in favor of the pro-
posing List will not be considered.
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d) Implementation of separate slips, in different colors for each category of candidates
subject to election (art. 55 cl. a23).
It does not regulate the ability to include candidates from lists made official by other po-
litical parties. This is why the constitutional provision that set forth an open list, ended up
being regulated as an unblocked one, as it only regulated the ability to cross out candida-
tes.
Subsequently, Act No. 406 was passed and raised the candidate cross-out threshold to
fifty per cent (50%) and one vote of the total number of valid votes cast in favor of the pro-
posing list24. This changed was enforced for the first time in the provincial elections of 1999,
making only one list submitted by one political party subject to this specific counting25 ;
which proves that since then, no list of candidates for the provincial Legislature won the
percentage necessary to enable its application26.
V.- Case Law Precedents
While there has been a precedent related to an unconstitutionality claim on Act No. 406,
which raised the cross-out threshold to fifty percent and one vote of the total number of
votes cast in favor of each candidate list, to enable the special counting procedure27; it is
true that only once the system's proportional effects were caviled, although they were only
tangentially addressed.
Two proceedings were instituted before the provincial Court of Appeals questioning the
way the Provincial Electoral Board counted valid votes to determine the enabling electoral
23 The relevant fragment of clause a), Art. 55 de la Ley Provincial 201: “There shall be a slip for each position type subject
to election, which according to the requirements in item 7 of Article 201 of the Provincial Constitution, will have different
colors and be physically separated. The Electoral Court of First Instance and Registry will be in charge of assigning colors
for each position category by means of the relevant legal instruments.”
24 Article 35 of Act 201 -currently in force- in its last paragraph, was finally worded as follows: “Cross-outs affecting can-
didates who do not exceed fifty per cent (50%) and one (1) vote of the total of valid votes cast in favor of the proposing
List, will not be considered.”
25 It belonged to the list of legislators made official by Movimiento Popular Fueguino, and the cross-out counting trig-
gered no change whatsoever to the order suggested to the electorate by said party.
26 No cross-outs made in the elections of years 2003, 2007, and 2011 complied with the minimum number that enabled
the especial counting procedure. It is worth mentioning that the Municipality of Ushuaia disregarded the cross-out
system when passing its Charter and implementing the preferential list voting system; while the Municipality of Rio
Grande, in its fundamental norm, chose to block the list of councilors, denying any chance of cross-out or preference.
That is the reason why the ability to cross-out candidates governs only for the categories of provincial legislators and
councilors from the city of Tolhuin.
27 Act 406 was the subject of legal proceedings intended to attain a sentence of unconstitutionality, which the Court of
Appeals did not agree to. The proceedings were started on 2006 and registered as “Bassanetti, Carlos Domingo y Carzo,
Mario José c/ Legislatura de Tierra del Fuego A. e I.A.S. s/ Sumario” (“Bassanetti, Carlos Domingo, and Carzo, Mario José
vs. Legislature of Tierra del Fuego A. and I.A.S. Summary”.) The provincial Election Judge admitted the action and declared
the unconstitutionality of Act 406, but the Civil and Commercial Chamber of the Court of Appeals, located in Ciudad de
Río Grande, accepted the appeal filed by the State Attorney through the delivery of the final judgement no. Said judge-
ment considered that the cross-out threshold was reasonable and admitted the disadvantages raised by the previous
cross-out thresholds (3% and 10%) during the last counting.
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threshold for seat allocation through the proportional D'Hondt method28. Two political
groups, which had presented candidates for legislators in the provincial elections of 2007,
put into question the criterion of considering blank votes as valid votes to determine the
equivalent to five per cent (5%) of votes as a legal barrier that political groups need to
overcome in order to participate in the seat allocation process. The challengers had attai-
ned figures near said amount, as provided for by Art. 34 of the Provincial Act. No. 201. If
only votes in favor of political parties were counted, they would have surpassed that mi-
nimum; but they did not reach the necessary amount if blank votes were considered in
the estimate29. This resulted in the objection of the seats allocated by the Provincial Elec-
toral Board and its submission to the highest Provincial Court.
It understood that the expression “valid votes” included votes cast in blank (as these are
not void and reflect an expression of the voter's will) to determine the enabling threshold
in order to engage in the D'Hondt method calculations for seat allocation, as it saw that
both the limitations resulting from the barrier and the type of electoral formula were a re-
asonable exercise of the regulating powers that all legal acts have as regards norms in the
Provincial Constitution30.
The Court of Appeals' decision agreed with the cases stated by the parties, which did
not affect the foundations of the provincial electoral act31.
These were mainly juristic cases, focused on static and partial expressions of the electoral
system. That is why it is so important to see beyond the juristic aspects and look at the
way the electoral system works throughout time, how its variables behave, and the weight
of its results. This vision will provide us with information on the so-desired results of pro-
portionality.
28 The proceedings were registered as “Frente Integración Fueguina s/ Promueve impugnación contra el Acta N° 18 de
la Junta Electoral Provincial – Medida Cautelar” (Expte. 2001/07) (Frente Integración Fueguina pushes objection to Record
No. 18 of the Provincial Electoral Board - Precautionary measure [2000/07]) and “Partido Federal Fueguino s/ Promueve
impugnación contra el Acta N° 18 de la Junta Electoral Provincial – Medida Cautelar” (2000/07) (Partido Federal Fueguino
pushes objection to Record No. 18 of the Provincial Electoral Board - Precautionary measure [2000/07]), which were con-
ducted against the results of the final counting of the 2007 provincial elections and expressed identical arguments.
29 Frente de Integración Fueguina won 2572 votes and Partido Federal Fueguino, 2976 votes, which represented 4.22%
and 4.89% of valid votes, respectively, taking into account blank votes cast for that category. That said, if those 14083
blank votes would have been disregarded and the plaintiffs' claim would have been accepted, when making the calcu-
lation with the total of votes cast in favor of the different political parties (46812 votes), their percentages would have
been higher (5.49% and 6.36%, respectively), they would have participated in the calculations with the D'Hondt method
and they would have been included in its resulting quotients.
30 In this regard, refer to considerations II, III and IV of the decision concerning the second question by Sagastume in the
proceedings labelled “Frente Integración Fueguina pushes objection to Record No. 18 of the Provincial Electoral Board
- Precautionary measure” (Docket 2001/07).
31 It is indeed distressing not being able to find in the Constituent Convention's session logs any intervention by members
of Movimiento Popular Fueguino -a political party that imposed by means of its own votes the text included in article
201 of the Provincial Supreme Law-, or by some of the other constituent parties, that could reveal if there was any kind
of intention whatsoever when inserting the phrase “effectively proportional representation.” The projects by Unión Cívica
Radical, Partido Justicialista, and Partido Socialista Auténtico did not include this manner as a guideline in the electoral
act (Constituent Convention. Session Log. Volume II, pages 1143, and 1144).
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VI.- Features of the provincial Electoral Regime: district magnitude, electoral barrier,
voting ballot structure, and candidate list structure
To make our point clear, it is necessary to mention that the provincial electoral regime
has the following features:
a) A district magnitude of fifteen (15) legislators.
b) Proportional electoral D'Hondt formula.
c) Party-based ballot structure, with each candidate category being physically separated
and in different colors32.
d) Unblocked list structure, by which voters can cross-out as many candidates as they
will from the candidates listed in the chosen ballot33.
e) Legal electoral threshold of five percent (5%) of the total of valid cast votes.
The regime of the Provincial Constitution implies a tempered Executive Branch, with
great Legislature faculties; and carries strong incentives so that no party, whether the go-
verning party or not, has absolute majority of members in it. The separate ballot and the
election of Legislators in the first electoral round contribute to this as these features favor
inconsistent votes.
Having laid down these elements and considerations, it can be interesting to gain insight
into the interaction of said elements in the make-up of electoral results and its impact on
the political-party system.
From 1991 until 2016, seven general elections have been called for provincial positions.
The first one was held with a minimum cross-out threshold of three percent (3%) of votes
won by the party which agreed to the pre-set distribution in the electoral proposal. The
threshold for the following election of 1995 was raised to ten percent (10%), and from 1999
to fifty percent (50%) and one vote, according to provisions in Act 406. This last modifica-
tion had the effect of virtually dispensing with the method up to this day34.
The passing of Act 406 was a reaction to the tremendous results that the application of “era-
sures” had in the elections held between 1991 and 1995. At the time, part of the political struc-
tures promoted maneuvers with a tendency to completely displace the order in candidate lists
as a means to solve party infightings, going as far as excluding components in a rival city 35.
32  Governor and vice-governor in one ballot, and Legislators in another ballot physically separated from the former, and
in different colors. If other municipal categories were also in election (Superintendent and councilors) the same criteria
prevails, according to local electoral legislation.
33 Electoral legislation does not regulate the ability to include candidates from other official lists, or any other subse-
quently sanctioned acts, as it was previously explained.
34 As it was mentioned above, at the provincial level, the candidate list of Movimiento Popular Fueguino was the only list
enabled to scrutiny in 1995; and we may add that for the municipality of Tolhuin, the same happened in the election of
2011 for Partido Justicialista, without modifying the list of counselors.
35 Indeed, in 1995 cross-outs mainly displaced candidates based in the city of Ushuaia in benefit of those residing in Río
Grande. The convention representative of MOPOF, Martinelli, made rather paradoxical declarations by refusing to envisage
such an event in year 1991, by saying: “We have no intention of foreseeing any kind of mal-intent or contemplating any
lack of civic or political culture in the residents of Tierra del Fuego, whichever city they come from, or that they might dis-
criminate against other candidates -once again- on the grounds of vicinity...” (Constituent Convention Session Logs, Volume
II, page 1151). The analysis carried by Tula and De Luca 1999 can be enlightening to learn about the impact of cross-outs:
97-146. It shows, for instance, how the candidates of Partido Justicialista, which were ranked in the 11th, 10th, 15th, 13th,
1st and 7th position, were elected among the 199 provincial legislators, given that they had the least amount of cross-outs.
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The system received so much criticism it had great influence and ended up promoting
the passing of the cited act, which required legislative pressure after the current Governor
vetoed the bill36.
With careful observation of the results of the provincial elections between 1991 and 2015,
we can arrive at a first conclusion: except now, all provincial governments have been divi-
ded37. Until 2015, there was not a single Governor who had a majority provided by their
own political party or electoral coalition formed before the election, so that they could have
numerical superiority to push their draft rules -as seen in Tables 1 and 2- which is why the
only way to secure governance was to form external consensus or “government coalitions.”
Table 1
Governor and number of legislators from the governing party (based on a total of 15
members in the Unicameral Legislature)
This Chart was prepared by the author with data from the Electoral Secretariat of the Federal Court of Us-
huaia, and the Electoral Court of First Instance of the Province of Tierra del Fuego, Antarctica and the Atlan-
tic South Islands.
36 Tula and De Luca (1999) mention journalistic stories of the time: “Los InXtachables” [The UneXceptionable], in El Sureño, De-
cember 6th 1991, page 3; “Tacha ..que me hiciste mal” [Cross-out... You Hurt Me Good], in Tiempo Fueguino, December 7th 1991,
page 14; “Tachas: el infierno tan temido” [Cross-outs: The Dreaded Hell], in Tiempo Fueguino, December 10th 1991, page 11; and
“Las tachas definieron las elecciones” [Cross-outs Defined the Election], in Tiempo Fueguino, December 12th 1991, pages 12-13.
As well as the articles “Cómo funcionó el sistema de tachas. Los fueguinos privilegiaron los candidatos sobre los partidos” [The
Workings of Cross-outs in the Election: Residents Privilege Candidates Over Parties], in Clarín, December 3rd 1991, page 5; and
“En Tierra del Fuego siguen de campaña. Las tachas demoran el escrutinio” [Tierra del Fuego: the Campaigning Continues. Cross-
outs Slow Down Counting], in Clarín, December 7th 1991, page 8. For the counselor elected in Río Grande, see “Banca, se vende”
[Seat for Sale] in Clarín, July 19th 1992, Section Two, pages 8-9.
37 Divided government refers to the one in which the executive branch belongs to one political party while lacking majority from
the beginning in the legislative branch (whether it derives from the number of legislators from their own party or a previous
electoral agreement -alliance or vote aggregation.) When this is the case, articulating government coalitions is the only way left.
38 Acronyms refer to the party names: Movimiento Popular Fueguino (MOPOF), Partido Justicialista (PJ), Unión Cívica Ra-
dical (UCR), Afirmación para una República Igualitaria (ARI), Frente para la Victoria (FPV), Partido Popular (PP) and Partido
Social Patagónico (PSP).
39 Frente de Unidad Popular (FUP) was an electoral alliance based on Unión Cívica Radical.
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Table 2
Composition Percentages of Provincial Legislatures
This Chart was prepared by the author with data from the Electoral Secretariat of the Federal Court of Us-
huaia, and the Electoral Court of First Instance of the Province of Tierra del Fuego, Antarctica and the Atlan-
tic South Islands.
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Given that ballots were physically separated in the darkroom, and the category of Legis-
lators is elected in the first round together with all candidates contesting the executive
branch, voters have an incentive to vote inconsistently in both segments. This particular cir-
cumstance goes hand in hand with Duverger's thoughts (1957: 265) who argued that “the
tendency in the second round to engender a multi-party regime seems rather feasible.”
This illustrates the sustained effect over time of the constitutional intention of a political
party that, at the time of its drafting, could not foresee optimistic outlooks on its electoral
growth; moreover, it was concerned with its survival and could not care about parameters
to ensure governability40.
The period under observation shows a strong difference between the number of political
parties presenting candidates for Governor and Vice-Governor, together with provincial Le-
gislators, and the number of parties only presenting candidates only for the latter category,
as illustrated in Chart 1. 
Chart 1
Number of political parties presenting candidate lists for provincial elective positions.
This Chart was 
prepared by the 
author with data
from the Electoral 
Secretariat of the 
Federal Court of 
Ushuaia, and the
Electoral Court of
First Instance of the
Province of Tierra del
Fuego, Antarctica and
the Atlantic South 
Islands. 
40 In effect, at the time the Provincial Constitution was sanctioned and excluding the integration of the Constituent Con-
vention, Movimiento Popular Fueguino was in retraction and putting a fight for its electoral survival. The table below
(taken from Tula and De Luca 1999: 142) provides detailed information on the election results for the renewal of members
of the Territorial Legislature: 
Note that in the election of 1983 ballots were separated and had different colors according to candidate categories. Agrupa-
ción Vecinal Unión Popular Fueguina, in effect in 1983, represents the genesis of this political force. From 1985 till 1989, ballots
were combined by candidate categories which required that if voters cut the slip if they wished to vote inconsistently.
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The number of parties that presented candidates for governor is higher than electoral
proposals, as some are often included more than once given the execution of vote aggre-
gation agreements. If we apply this last criterion, the number of parties would be even les-
ser (e.g., for the 2011 election, there would be only 6 candidate proposals for governor and
vice-governor, and for 2015, only 4.)
A ballot structure separated by parties; the reality of a divided government; the rising
cross-out barrier; the lack of legal requirements to form new parties; and the difficulties
found by political elites when trying to coordinate alliances stimulated this situation41.
Multiple parties focused their strategy on presenting segmented nominations as they
evaluated that the system offered better chances of conquering a legislative seat, given
the proportional system, and did not go for the executive category.
Notice the sustained growth of political parties that submitted lists of candidates for
legislators, in opposition to the executive category. The legislative offer augmentation
process coincides with the application of the raising cross-out barrier by virtue of Act
406, which became effective for the first time in the election of 1999 and affected only
one political party whose candidate list had to undergo the special scrutiny, although
the results did not cause any displacements in the proposed candidate order.
The cross-out method, despite its flaws and distortions, offered a chance to dissolve
-in an informal manner and aside from party structures- power struggles within a par-
ticular political group. The three- and later ten-percent (3%;10%) barriers proved to be
easily overcome by these internal lines and produced the aforementioned candidate
displacements. The substantial rise of the cross-out barrier imposed significant efforts
to all groups willing to use them, which lacked thereafter the effective mobilization or
logistics to do so, as demonstrated by the results of the first election in which it was ap-
plied (year 1999). Consequently, the number of political parties in pursuit of conquering
exclusively legislative positions increased gradually and steadily, and if they got suc-
cessful outcomes, they could make up coalitions ex post facto or provide -and why not,
remove- their electoral support to candidates for governor facing a second electoral
round.
Blank votes in the Legislator category were always higher than those related to the go-
vernor and vice-governor category. This kind of vote increased steadily through the years
(Chart 2) and ended in the highest amount of lost votes regarding the Provincial Legis-
lative branch, given the downturn of votes with legislative representation (Chart 3).
The same has not however occurred for blank votes in the provincial executive category.
It repeatedly suffered a strong fall in the second round with respect to the first, which
may be due to the psychological effects that majority systems with double rounds have
on voters; besides the expectations and polarization that said event triggers in the elec-
torate before the resolution of a candidacy with higher institutional value.
41 Every electoral system has mechanical and psychological effects on voters and political elites. In this regard, it is inte-
resting that no partnerships emerged among minority political parties, which are underrepresented in the legislative
branch or cannot access to it at all as a result of the D'Hondt method, the electoral threshold and number of blank votes.
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Chart 2
Percentage of Blank Votes42
Chart 3
Votes with Legislative Representation43 
The chart above indicates which percentage was necessary for political parties to exceed
the electoral threshold limit and enter the allocation process to get hold of all contested
seats; with an initial point of 77.40% in 1991, falling alarmingly to 29.65%, as verified in the
last election of 2015.









the Province of 





blank votes as no
second electoral
round took place.














42 In 1995 there was not a second electoral round for the governor category, as the official candidate reached absolute
majority in the first election.
43 The estimate of the total of votes with legislative representation is based on the total number of votes that produced
seat allocations, excluding the blank vote estimate and votes received by diverse political groups which did not reach
the minimum threshold determined by the electoral act, to participate in seat allocation by the D'Hondt method.
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This is the reason why, besides the constant loss of support by parties that had traditio-
nally obtained legislative positions, we observe a rising disproportion of legislature inte-
gration in the shape of a notable increment of the number of parties which had a chance
to get hold of a seat and those that effectively achieved their goal.
The considerations cited above suggest that the increase in political parties presenting
legislative candidacies, the increment of blank votes in that category, together with the
presence of a legal threshold and the D'Hondt system's tendency to overrepresent the
most voted parties aggravate the disproportionality generated by the electoral system.
Table 2 includes percentages that provide some orientation in this regard and offer infor-
mation to establish the differences between the number of votes and the number of seats.
Charts No. 4, 5, 6, and 7 illustrate more graphically the difference between votes and
seats for the main provincial political parties over the period considered.
Chart 4
Number of Votes and Number of Seats for Movimiento Popular Fueguino
This Chart was 
prepared by the 
author with data
from the Electoral
Secretariat of the 
Federal Court of 
Ushuaia, and the
Electoral Court of
First Instance of the
Province of 




This Chart was prepared
by the author with data
from the Electoral 
Secretariat of the Federal
Court of Ushuaia, and
the Electoral Court of
First Instance of the 
Province of Tierra del
Fuego, Antarctica and
the Atlantic South 
Islands. 
For the election of year
2011, we consider the
combination of two can-
didate lists (PJ-FPV) as
they represent aspects of
the same political move-
ment and also came to-
gether in a list in 2007.
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Chart 5
Number of Votes and Number of Seats for Partido Justicialista – Frente para la Victoria
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Chart 6
Number of Votes and Number of Seats for Unión Cívica Radical
Chart 7
Number of Votes and Number of Seats for Partido ARI - PSP
The difference between percentages of votes and percentages of allocated seats, as an-
ticipated, is known as “disproportionality”44 . The charts above show the existence of dis-
proportionality, as there are differences between those two variables. However, we are
more interested in knowing the level of disproportionality the electoral system is producing
as a whole.
44 If there is disproportionality, this means some parties turn out to be underrepresented (that is, they have less seats or
no seat at all) as a result of the overrepresentation the system provides to others. On the contrary; the more proportional
the system, the greater the correspondence between votes and seats.
This Chart was 
prepared by the 
author with data
from the Electoral
Secretariat of the 
Federal Court of 
Ushuaia, and the
Electoral Court of
First Instance of the
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To measure the disproportion between votes and allocated seats, Political Sciences use
different methods as a guide. I will apply the most commonly used ones: the method pro-
posed by Douglas Rae45 (average deviation), the method developed by Michael Gallagher46
(least squares), and the method formulated by Loseemore and Hamby47 , all of which are
represented in Table 348.
The estimation is based on all percentages of votes and percentages of seats effectively
earned by political parties involved in the elections for the period between 1991 and 2015,
which are processed according to the features of each formula. The closer the result is to a
zero (0) value, the greater the proportionality of the electoral system. Conversely, as the
electoral system moves away from the zero value, it produces greater disproportionality.
Table 3
Disproportion in the Provincial Legislature
This Table was prepared with electoral information from the Electoral Secretariat of the Federal Court of
Ushuaia, and the Electoral Court of First Instance of the Province of Tierra del Fuego, Antarctica and the
Atlantic South Islands.
All three indexes show that the electoral system produces a Legislature with dispropor-
tionality levels that are increasing with time. This phenomenon deepens starting from 2003
–the second election where the cross-out threshold imposed by Act 406 was applied, and
in which political agents could put into practice learnings from the 1999 electoral results.
It was only with the Legislature election of 2011 that this growing disproportionality pau-
sed.
45  It results from the sum of the remainders between percentage of seats and percentage of votes for the parties winning
at least 0.5% of votes. The partial result is divided by the number of parties considered.
46 It results from the sum of the square values derived from the difference between percentage of seats and percentage of
votes for each party. The partial result is divided by two and then, by calculating its square root.
47 It results from the sum of the remainders between percentage of seats and percentage of votes for the parties winning
at least 0.5% of votes. The partial result is divided by two. 
48 Explanation and examples of these indexes in-use are available in Urdánoz Ganuza 2006, among others: 257-296.
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The data presented can be illustrated in a measles chart from which emerges a trend
line. But first, so as to better understand the provincial electoral system results, we will refer
to the following chart (Chart 8), where there is total and correlative proportionality bet-
ween votes and seats.
Chart 8
Exact Proportionality Model between Votes and Seats
As noted here, a trend line is mapped in the chart and divides the area in identical parts,
which represents an exact proportionality. However, the data analyzed from provincial
elections extracted from Table 2 suggests how close local results are to that proportionality
ideal.
Chart 9
Relation between Percentage of Votes and Percentage of Seats (1991-2015)
This Chart was prepared with electoral information from the Electoral Secretariat of the Federal Court of
Ushuaia, and the Electoral Court of First Instance of the Province of Tierra del Fuego, Antarctica and the
Atlantic South Islands.
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The chart shows, with the real dots above the imaginary diagonal that emerges from the
intersection of the axis (which bears 0% of votes together with 50% of seats, representing
absolute proportionality), the overrepresentation produced by the system as a whole over
the period under study, thus proving the arguments in this article.
VII.- Conclusions
The results shown indicate that, after being in force for twenty-five years, the provincial
electoral system has produced only one Governor who kept matching absolute majority
in the Provincial Legislature whether achieved by themselves or through electoral part-
nerships. All consensus achieved are owe to the creation of political, and eventual, govern-
ment coalitions.
Today, the Provincial Government has a Legislative absolute majority from its own elec-
toral coalition for the first time, although this results from a notable lack of balance in the
electoral system.
Indeed, it is confirmed that there is a distinct disproportion, sustained over time, in the
ratio of votes in support of political parties and seats allocated in the Legislature to some
of them. Up to and including year 1999, there is a concentration of vote percentages in
favor of a particular group of political parties (Partido Justicialista, Movimiento Popular
Fueguino and Unión Cívica Radical.) Thereafter, a steady fractioning of the party system
has started and is still continuing.
Since 2003, the traditional set of political parties with legislative presence is falling in
number of votes towards the limits of the electoral threshold.
This threshold came into being to restrict the incorporation of new political parties in
interaction with the electoral formula, the increasing number of political groups presenting
candidates, and the number of blank votes, which is constantly climbing and affects how
seats are distributed. This combination has brought an overrepresentation of these three
political parties and proves to be restrictive for incorporating new forces –except for the
Legislature elected in 2011– and requires further studies that consider sociological varia-
bles– specially, to analyze the rise in blank votes and determine its root causes.
What we can certainly assert is that two of the forces reached by the effects of this syste-
mic disproportionality are inextricably falling towards the dangerous limit that could soon
deprive them of securing representation.
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